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This article presents a number of propositions about differences in public and private organizations, which have implications for their management. ' The propositions extend and refine consideration of the question which was recently addressed by Michael A. Murray in this Review (36) . Murray suggests that public and private organizations are converging and facing similar constraints and challenges, and that management in all types of organizations should be viewed as a generic process. Yet our inquiry into this comparative question points to the conclusion that it is premature to discount the significance of publicprivate differences and their implications for management training and practice.
Numerous scholars and observers, of considerable reputation and experience, have addressed themselves to the comparative issue, and it is important that their observations be compiled and considered. Yet no systematic effort at integration has covered relatively recent contribution^.^ In making such a review, we found consensus on a number of important distinctions, which are relevant to research, training, and practice. Moreover, in addition to these specific points of agreement, there are general reasons to approach the subject of public-private comparisons carefully, and to avoid premature dismissal of its significance:
1. Normative, Prescriptive Implications. There are widely discussed concerns over whether various aspects of the convergence of the two sectors are good or bad. Solutions are proposed and arguments made concerning the appropriate roles and functions of the organizations in the two sectors. A ready example is the concern over "capture" of the regulatory agencies, and the proposal that some activities be deregulated. Generally, then, which techniques and attributes of public and private organizations should be preserved or abolished, exchanged or kept separate?
2. Implications for Knowledge and Understanding. Prescriptions will be no better than our understanding of the phenomena. Deregulation proposals, for instance, will provide successful solutions only if their underlying assumptions about the effects of market competition are accurate. To the extent, then, that there is still a divergence between public and private organizations and their management, the divergence should be isolated and studied as a source of information about the workings of organizations in an increasingly complex society.
3. Theoretical Implications. Consideration of the comparative question involves some of the basic issues in the effort to systematize knowledge about organizations and management, including the choice of units and levels of analysis and of major variables. These choices are in turn related to the effort to devise concepts, testable propositions, and models.
Analysis of similarities and differences between public and private organizations raises major difficulties of classification and definition which will not be quickly resolved. Nevertheless, an effort must be made to clarify the issue by suggesting resolutions to the classificatory problems, before proceeding to the comparisons themselves.
Approaches to Classification and Definition
Ideally, an inquiry such as this would involve two steps: (1) A clear definition of "public" and "private" sector organizations, which would specify the essential or basic differences and draw a clear line between the two. (2) Specification of the full range of variation, which is empirically and logically related to the basic or "defining" differences. Unfortunately, success at the first step is elusive or impossible, as one can see in the efforts at delineation of the subject matter of public administration (1 0) (27) . This difficulty complicates the issue, but as we will soon see, there are a number of authors who nevertheless get on with the second step.
The difficulty of saying precisely and thoroughly what we mean by "public" and "private" is reflected in a number of methods of handling the issue which can be observed in the literature, and which might be characterized as follows: (1) Common sense approaches, in which an author discusses the relationship of the sectors without explicit definitions, apparently assuming that everyone has an adequate idea of what he is talking about. Weidenbaum (58) is concerned that government-by-contract will cause some corporations to lose their "essential privateness," but never explicitly defines his meaning. (2) Practical definitions, in which unsubtle rules of thumb are applied, due to the need for a definition. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, for example, calculates indices in which the Postal Service and TVA are counted as private sector activities. (3) Denotative approaches, in which a sector is delineated by simply listing the activities or organizations which fall within its purview (17). (4) Analytic approaches, which attempt distinctions on the basis of defining factors or sets of factors. Economists, for example, frequently base the distinctions on the nature of the goods produced, i.e., the concept of "social" or "collective" goods.
Yet none of these approaches can succeed in drawing a clear line between the sectors (25). There are always intermediate types, and overlaps on various dimensions. The wide, varied, and continually evolving engagement of government in aspects of life in the United States formerly considered private, or still predominatly so, causes a "blurring" or convergence of the sectors which has been frequently noted (9X 10)(19). This "blurring" seems to involve two interrelated phenomena. First, there is an intermingling of governmental and nongovernmental activities, which is observable in government regulation of various activities, and in various "mixed" undertakings such as public enterprises and provision of government services by contract with private corporations. The other, related aspect is an increasing similarity of function, context, or role of the organizations in the two sectors. Gawthorp (19) argues that coping with environmental "turbulence" will be such a major concern of managers in both sectors that differences on other factors will be overshadowed. Weidenbaum (58) observes that some corporations are so dependent on government contracts that they may take on certain attributes of government agencies. Galbraith (1 8) argues that many firms have so much market power and influence on the public interest that it is no longer appropriate to regard them as "private." Similarly, there are discussions of the need for greater social responsibility and public accountability on the part of private corporations (37x38) (44).
This "blurring" certainly complicates the delineation of the sectors, but the real question is how much to make of it. A distinction can be blurred and still be meaningful; a number of authors note this difficulty in clear differentiation, yet go on to cite important differences between public and private organizations (5X9X10) (25)(57)(58). It seems clear that one could identify large groups of organizations which represent a hard core of public and private organizations, in that they are distinct on a number of basic characteristics (and magnitudes). Even though no single organization need have all of these basic attributes, it seems reasonable to speak of "typical" government and business organizations, in the fashion of Banfield (5) and Weidenbaum (58) , which share a large proportion of this cluster of attributes (3).3
Criteria of the Search
Having addressed these problems concerning definition and classification, one can turn to a considerable literature which addresses the broader question of the full set of possible distinctions between public and private organizations and management. In compiling these references, a number of guidelines were followed. The review covered relatively visible and accessible materials (major texts, journals, and convention presentations) which were for the most part relatively recent. Except in a few cases they were explicitly comparative of public and private organizations or administrative processes in the United States. Reported below are most of the observations and propositions which were stated by several authors with enough similarity in phrasing and intent to make it seem reasonable to group them into one (see Table I for summary of propositions).
There were many problems encountered in making such a compilation, and inevitably some violence was done to the phrasing, logic, and priorities of some of the authors. Nevertheless, the material that follows provides a reasonable summary of the major points of consensus in the literature.
Findings
The points of consensus are grouped into several categories which are our own devices for presenting the material. We proceed from what we interpreted as environmental factors, to propositions about transactions of organizations with their environments, then to propositions concerning factors withln organizations, including the individual in the organization. The interrelationships mentioned are those cited in the literature, although numerous other relationships among the factors and propositions could be proposed.
I. Environmental Factors
A number of the assertions by authors can be fairly characterized as involving factors which are environmental, in the sense that they are external to organizations, and are largely out of their control. Most of the relationships of these factors with internal structures and processes will be mentioned in following sections.
I. 1. Market Exposure. Many references cite differences between public and private organizations which are related to involvement or lack of involvement with the economic market as a source of resources, information, and constraints. As a source of revenues and resources, it is argued, the market enforces relatively automatic penalties and rewards, and thus provides incentives to cost reduction, operating efficiency, and effective performance (2)(9)(12) (29)(40)(46) (48)(52)(55) (57) . On the other hand, organizations which obtain resources through an appropriations process in a political context are less subject to such influences; cost reductions might be avoided or deemphasized on a number of bases, such as political influences or a number of multiple, vague criteria of a "public interest" nature. Appropriations may be based largely on past levels, thus creating an incentive to use up previous appropriations. Drucker (16) discounts the importance of some of the other distinctions mentioned in thls summary, yet stresses the tendencies to ineffectiveness on the part of organizations which acquire resources via "budget allocations" instead of market performance. It is frequently argued that managers of organizations financed by appropriations will seek organizational growth and personal aggrandizement by maximizing appropriations, and thus tend to deemphasize operating efficiency (12x16) (40x52). Closely related to this entire set of propositions about the influence of the market mechanism on operating efficiency and effectiveness are several proposals for improving administration of government programs by the introduction of market-type competition among programs providing services (29x40) (48x52).
A number of authors also stress the connection between exposure to economic markets and allocational efficiency, in the economist's sense of maximizing satisfaction by matching supply to demand, reflecting consumer preferences, etc. (9)(13)(40) (41)(47)(52).
Ostrom (41), for example, argues that public organizations are subject to a number of dysfunctions, including less sensitivity to diseconomies of scale, failure to proportion supply to demand, failure to adequately account for consumer preferences, and a number of other failings. A number of authors, particularly those who might be characterized as "public choice" enonomists, stress the difficulties and possible allocational inefficiencies which are Intermingled with the foregoing ideas about operating and allocational efficiency are frequent references to the importance of the market as a source of relatively clear, quantitative demand indicators, goals, and performance measures (i.e., prices, sales, profits) (5)(9)(12) (14x20) (33)(5 1). Such relatively clear information is conducive to operating efficiency and effectiveness, because it clarifies objectives and performance evaluation. It aids in achievement of allocational efficiency through clearer indications of user preferences, economies of scale, and demand for particular services.
1. 2. Legal and Fomtal anstraints. In positing differences in public and private organizations in the United States, a number of authors focus on the impact of the formal, legal environment of government organizations, especially as it relates to their autonomy and flexibility.
It is argued that while private organizations need only obey the law and the regulations of regulatory agencies, government organizations tend to have their purposes, methods, and spheres of operation defined and constrained by law and legally authorized institutions to a much greater degree (5x3 1x33) (39)(51) (53)(61). One effect of these constraints is that public managers have less choice as to entry and withdrawal from various undertaking (5).
Others note a tendency to "legalism" (3 1) and "legal habit" (21) in the public sector-a proliferation of formal specifications and controls by statute, court rulings, and hierarchical superiors (8) . Similarly, Dahi and Lindblom (12) attach significance to the fact that public agencies are subject to hierarchically or bureaucratically administered external controls. Several authors, in citing the fragmentation of authority in government and government organizations, see it as a result of multiple formal checks and institutions (see 111. 2. below). Finally, regular popular elections and political appointments, as formal mechanisms of leader selection, are cited as a disruptive influence on internal operations in government agencies (5)(7)(56).
I. 3. Political Influences. Reference to popular elections and political appointments brings up another set of observations, those concerning "political" influences on the operations of governme nt organizations (1)(20)(2 1) (25)(3 1 )(33)  (52)(57) (59x61) . These propositions are inter-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW related with those concerning formal influences, but tend to be broader, encompassing not only the multiple formal, institutional constraints, but also the less formalized processes of influence, such as interest group demands and lobbying, and interventions by individual congressmen. These assertions range from very broad references to the more "political" character of government work (1) to somewhat more specific observations about the effects of greater diversity and intensity of influences on government decision making (56). It is argued that these multiple, diverse interests necessitate bargaining (1 1 X12) , and make objectives and decision-making criteria more complex, due to greater concern for "public opinion" (59) and the reactions of various interests (21x26) (31x33). Another consequence is the requirement that agencies and their managers build support from various consituencies, interests, and authorities (34)(57)(6 1).
II. Orwization-Environment Transactions
A number of propositions are primarily concerned with characterizing the relationship of the organization to the entities in its environment. Some of these assertions are very similar, in their implications for internal operations, to some of those already noted, but are sufficiently different in approach to be listed separately. Individuals cannot avoid participation in the financing of most government activities, and in the consumption of many of the outputs of government. Obviously, this proposition can be related to the absence of the market mechanism, which provides for individual choice in the consumption of goods and services. The coercive nature of most government actions might be cited as a fundamental justification for constitutional checks and balances and extensive formal control mechanisms. I1 2. Nature of Policy Impacts. There are a number of propositions which might be roughly categorized as references to the greater influence or impact of public sector decisions: Appleby (1) sees government as distinct due to its unique breadth of scope, impact, and consideration; Mainzer (3 1) notes the wider range of concerns in public, as compared to private, administration; Wamsley and Zald (57) cite the unique symbolic significance of government actions; and Banfield (5) cites the opportunity to participate in large affairs, and to achieve power and glory, as incentives of greater importance in public than in business organizations. At a more operational level, an administrator experienced in both public and private organizations observed that government executives are involved in decisions which are more important and influential (59).
11. 3. Public Scrutiny. Closely related to a number of propositions under preceding categories are general assertions that public administrators are subject to greater public scrutiny (1x33) (39)(5 1). In a similar vein, Banfield (5) argues that government organizations are able to keep fewer secrets than businesses, and are more subject to outside monitoring. Actually, a number of the earlier arguments concerning formal and political influences could be interpreted as relevant to "public scrutiny"; they refer to mechanisms of oversight and accountability, and to the multiplicity of representatives involved in the consideration of an agency's actions.
As noted earlier, there are indications of increasing public scrutiny of large private corporations, and increasing concern with their impact on the public interest. In view of the foregoing propositions, however, it seems premature to assume that there are no differences in the public scrutiny of government agencies and private corporations.
If. 4. Public Expectations. Closely related to "public scrutiny" propositions are a number of references to the unique role requirements of public organizations and public officials. According to Wamsley and Zald (57), a basic difference between public and private organizations is that public organizations are perceived as being owned by the state and citizens; citizens therefore have rights and expectations they do not have in relation to private organizations. Similarly, Caiden (10) feels that citizens expect more of public administrators in the way of "integrity, fairness, responsiveness, [and] accountability (no secrets)." If. 5. Nature of Goods Produced. As basis for a number of the propositions about the effects of market exposure (I. 1. above), economists note that government and government organizations are involved primarily in production of "public" and "quasi-public" goods. With some variety in phrasing, they observe that the nature of public goods (in terms of "marketability," "excludability," "rivalness of consumption," etc.) precludes application of prices and the market mechanism. Quasi-public goods are sufficiently packageable for the application of prices, user charges, or some mechanism of individual choice in consumption, but involve "significant externalties" (26) and are provided at a cost to users which is lower than the cost of production (9)(26).
Internal Structures and Processes
A number of observations in the literature are more directly relevant to the internal operations and structures of organizations, such as decision making, individual authority, and motivation.
Iff. I. Objectives and Evaluation Ch'teria. Probably the most frequently cited distinction between business organizations and government organization is a difference in the nature of goals and performance measures of the two types of organizations. (This difference is variously phrased as a reference to goals, objectives, values, performance measures, decision criteria, etc.) The objectives and performance criteria of public sector organizations tend to differ from those of business organizations along at least three dimensions:
1. Multiplicity and Diversity (4)(5)(9) (1 2)(21)(26) (3 1)(35)(49) (56)(57)(59). The mix of objectives and criteria is said to be more complex. In addition to multiple formal program objectives, there are political feasibility considerations. A number of less explicit criteria such as accountability, openness, and fairness may be enforced through both formal and "political" mechanisms.
2. Vagueness and Intangibility (5)(7)(12) (15)(20)(24) (26)(35) (48)(59). It is noteworthy that the references which were primarily concerned with application of systematic and quantitative analysis in the public sector all made a point of the unique difficulties in specifying and quantifying performance measures in the public sector (1 5)(26)(35). Drake (1 5) in particular, presents an extensive list of differences, such as the greater difficulty of actually defining the issue for analysis, and the greater difficulty of applying a quantitative model due to the complex interrelationships among government activities. (Drake apparently sees the military as similar to business in applicability of quantitative techniques.)
3 . Goal Conflict (5)(20)(35) (49x59). Numerous references to conflicts and "trade-offs" among objectives, values, and criteria should not be surprising in view of the multiple, complex constraints and expectations focused on government, noted earlier. Siffin (50) gives an example of the pursuit of directly conflicting objectives in the same government organization. Another example is provided by the frequent observation that in government, operating efficiency (especially in the narrow sense of cost reduction) is often deemphasized in relation to other criteria (1)(20X3 1) (47x49). One can cite origins of these "other criteria" in a number of the propositions already presented, such as the unique public scrutiny and expectations of government.
The aim in this section is not to suggest that businessmen seek only more sales and profits. Clearly they, too, are faced with a complex mix of objectives, and with the frequent inadequacies of quantitative measures as representations of the quality of performance. Nevertheless, the literature advances too many observations concerning the greater multiplicity, vagueness, and conflict of objectives of public sector organizations for such propositions to be brushed aside as not potentially significant to the practice of management and preparation for it.
111. 2. Hierarchical Authority and the Role of the Administrator. The multiple political and legal influences on U.S. government organizations are related to some particular attributes of hierarchical authority in government, which have implications for the role of the administrator. In general, obsewers regard hierarchical authority as weaker in the Executive Branch of government than in business organizations. Sometimes the weakness is related very generally to the fragmentation and complexity of governments at all levels (5)(19) (61). More specifically, some authors relate the "lack of control" (20) to the ability of subordinates to bypass hierarchical superiors by appealing to alternative formal authorities or political constituencies (20x2 1)(61), thus making for weaker, more fragmented authority than is usually found in business organizations (5)(21). Moreover, there are some assertions that public administrators have less autonomy and flexibility in making their own decisions than their privatesector counterparts (5)(7)(8) (1 9)(21) (3 1 x59) . The multiple legal, statutory, and procedural controls noted earlier are an obvious source of these limitations. For example, merit principles limit the flexibility of public administrators in hiring, firing, and controlling the incentives of their subordinates (5)(7) (19) . Constraints on PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW choice of methods and spheres of operation have already been cited (I. 2. above). Other references note unique difficulties in supervision, delegation, and subcompartmentalization (into profit centers, for example) in the public sector, due to the lack of specific objectives and performance measures (5)(6)(21) (32x48). Inability to specify clear objectives and performance measures makes it harder to supervise and control subordinates, and results in reluctance to delegate, in multiple levels of review and approval, and in a proliferation of regulations (21)(58)(48). The lack of specific and quantitative criteria is said to limit the tendency of public administrators to attempt innovations, since it is difficult to evaluate the potential impact of an innovation (6x20).
There are suggestions that the necessity to maintain constituencies, to deal with multiple external influences, and to seek appropriations in a political context have implications for the roles of the high-level manager in a government organization. Nigro and Nigro (39) cite the requirement for "exposition" as well as competence. Stockfisch (52) notes the requirement to combine "political adroitness" with professional expertise. Mintzberg (34) concludes from a study of managerial work that the requirement to deal with external coalitions and to make politically sensitive decisions make the "liaison, spokesman, and negotiator roles" more important for chief executives of public organizations. 1 1 1 3. Performance Characteristics. A number of authors have made observations concerning the performance of government organizations and administrators, usually in comparison to business, and have frequently focused on dysfunctions in government organizations. Dahl and Lindblom (12) assert that "agencies" suffer more than "enterprises" from red tape, buck-passing, timidity, and rigidity. Downs notes tendencies in "bureaus" to inertia, routinization, and inflexibility. Golembiewski (21) sees a greater tendency to procedural regularity and caution in government agencies, as compared to businesses. When Weidenbaum (58) worries that some corporations are becoming so dependent on government contracts that they are losing their "essential privateness," he apparently is referring to their innovativeness, their taking and bearing of risks. Schultz (48) says that the inadequacy of performance measures in government results in risk avoidance by individuals and institutions; success cannot be recognized easily, but mistakes can be singled out and punished. Arguments concerning the greater difficulty in evaluating a proposed innovation are noted above (111. 2.). "Scheduled disruptions" (7x20) in the form of elections and political appointments tend to interrupt sustained implementation of plans and projects. Thus, there are a number of propositions to the effect that government organizations tend to be characterized by cautiousness, inflexibility, and lack of innovativeness.
III. 4. Incentives. The literature also contains some propositions concerning differences in incentive structures and employee valuations of incentives in public organizations, which are of potential significance to training for management and the practice of management (45)(46). Schultze (48) notes the greater difficulty in devising incentives for effective performance of government programs, largely as a result of difficulties in performance evaluation when objectives are vague. A number of proposals for introducing competition as an incentive to effective performance have been noted above (I. 1 .).
There are also some indications of differences in the kinds of incentives which are available, and the kinds to which employees are responsive (5)(7) (28) (42) . Banfield (5) argues that the most important incentives offered to private sector employees are material incentives, primarily money. In government, he says, nonpecuniary incentives such as job security, involvement in important affairs, and "power and glory," figure more importantly. Lawler (28) cites extensive evidence that people who work in business organizations attach more importance to pay than do persons in nonprofit organizations; a study of his own indicated such a difference between employees in industrial and government organizations. Recent findings by Rawls, et al. (42) give similar indications. Thus, not only are there suggestions of greater constraints on the ability of public administrators to manipulate incentives (merit system constraints contribute to these limitations, of course), there are indications of differences in individual valuations of various incentives.
III. 5. Individual Differences. A handful of empirical studies suggest individual differences in addition to the differences in valuation of incentives suggested just above. Rawls, et al. (42) found that, as compared to students planning employment in the profit sector, students planning nonprofit sector employment were more likely to have played roles as change agents in the school; their responses on personality scales were higher on dominance, flexibility, and capacity for status, and they placed lower value on economic wealth. Other studies have found indications that government managers show lower work and need satisfaction (7)(43), lower organizational commitment (7), higher need for achievement, and lower need for affiliation (22) . Although one should be cautious pending further replication and corroboration of these findings, they suggest differences with important implications for research and practice, and at least provide justification for further inquiry into differences at the individual level.
Implications
Consensus is not "proof." Yet as much as we would like to rely on extensive, conceptually clear empirical research, we are faced with the immediate decisions as to whether the comparative question is worth pursuing, and whether there are noteworthy differences in public and private "management" which in turn have implications for management training. Since space constraints preclude elaboration of conflicts on some points (16)(53), and of possible paradoxes or conflicts among some of the propositions themselves, pending further refinement and corroboration one should be cautious about assuming the accuracy of any individual proposition and about overstating its importance. With that disclaimer clearly in mind, we must do our best to answer the immediate questions.
Implications for Research. The strong normative concerns mentioned at the outset, together with strong consensus on certain points of comparison, justify further attention to the comparative question. For instance, Weidenbaum's (58) concern over loss of entrepreneurial characteristics by firms reliant on government contracts emphasizes the importance of comparative research on innovation (111. 3.a.) in the public and private sectors (45)(46)-is business really more flexible and innovative than government? Even if the public-private distinction is, or proves to be, less important than other major variables for organizational analysis, comparative research can provide findings on those other variables and issues. For example, investigation of the propositions presented above can provide findings relevant to the effects of different environmental constraints on organizational processes and performance, to the effects of different incentive systems, and to other issues of importance to general understanding of organizations.
Implications for Management. As a way of briefly suggesting that there are some important distinctions between public and private management, one might apply some of the propositions listed above to a few of the elements which Murray (36) sees as common to all management. He offers a quotation (p. 365) to the effect that, among other things, management always involves the following: defining purposes and objectives, planning, selecting managers, managing and motivating people, and controlling and measuring results. The points of agreement in the literature suggest that there may be distinctions within these categories which should be further considered:
1. Purposes, objectives, and planning. Public administrators may have less flexibility and autonomy in defining purposes (I. 2.a.). Objectives may be more diverse (111. 1.a.) and harder to specify (111. 1.b.). Planning may involve a more complex set of influences (I. 3.a.), and long-term planning may be more difficult (111. 3.b.).
2. Selection, management, and motivation. There may be greater constraints on a public administrator's ability to select and control subordinates (111. 2.b. and 11. 2.c.). He may need to consider a different set of employee needs and motivational problems (111. 5.), which must also be considered in selection decisions.
3. Controlling and measuring results. A public administrator may find it not only harder to measure results (I. 1 ., 111. 1 .), but also, partially as a consequence of that difficulty, harder to attain results and effective performance (111. 2., 111. 3., 111. 4.).
Thus, there are strong indications of unique procedures and constraints within the broad procedural categories which characterize all management. Educational implications of these differences further underscore their significance.
Implications for Training. It is difficult to see how a core curriculum in "generic management" could extend beyond a handful of joint courses, such as organization theory and basic quantitative skills. Even in those courses, difficulties as to the mix of readings, cases, and examples may arise. Drake (1 5), for example, discusses unique quantitative training needs of public administration students, due to the "fuzzier" problems they may encounter. Beyond these few subjects, optimal prepa-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW ration for management in the two types of organizations would call for different emphases, some of which readily come to mind-more emphasis on political institutions and processes, on government budgeting, on public policy analysis, and on administrative law instead of business law. Together with a concentration in a functional area such as criminal justice or transportation, these emphases would result in such divergence in course assignments that there seems no particular utility in establishing 'generic" curricula. Moreover, one could argue the need for public service trainees to devote continuing consideration to certain aspects of public service, such as concern for the public interest, and the responsibilities of the government official. One might interpret The President's Report of Harvard (24), which argues the need for public service training programs due to the intangible, multiple goals of public programs, as a reference to these unique considerations. It may be that such an emphasis is most effective in a separate, or nearseparate, environment.
In sum, there are indications of a number of important differences between public and private organizations, which cannot be ignored in considerations of management research, training, and practice. More importantly, there are reasons to continue public and private comparisons, not in rejection of efforts at general understanding of organizations and their management, but in the effort to supplement it.
Notes
1 . Although we take for granted many commonalities among organizations (53), we focus almost exclusively on "differences," to specify points of contention for further inquiry. We continually refer to public and private organizations, although we consider all the propositions relevant to "management" in those organizations. In closing we make suggestions as to this relevance, but it is a matter for continuing consideration. We sometimes substitute "government" for "public" where the literature is specific in its referent, on the assumption that government organizations represent the major core of public organizations, although "public" might be defined to include some "third sector" or quasigovernmental organizations. The term "sector" is a higher-order analytic term which refers to sets of organizations, and we use it only where appropriate in this way. Moreover, the term is associated more closely with economic, than with social and political functions. However, alternative concepts are also insufficiently comprehensive, or are awkwardly unfamiliar. Promising alternatives are the terms "field" and "network," used by students of interorganizational relations. 
